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ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses the threat that mines in the surf zone (ten foot curve to the 
high water mark) pose to Operational Maneuver From The Sea. Additionally, problems 
presented by minefields beginning at the high water mark and extending inland are 
reviewed. 
Effectiveness of notional minefields consisting of tilt rod and pressure fused 
anti-tank. mines are modeled as a planar Poisson process. The delivery of the assault 
echelon (a Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)) by landing craft is modeled as a 
simple circular flow process. 
Three methods for overcoming the mineficlds are developed and compared 
using five· measures of effectiveness. A decision criteria for breaching a minefield by 
bulling through is offered. A breaching concept using fuel air explosives and a unique 
mine rake are presented. 
The thesis concludes that development of the "Blast, Rake, Breach" concept 
should be pursued. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The execution of an amphibious assault is perhaps the most complel( of all 
military operations. It involves the movement of personnel and material across the 
sea and the delivery of these forces to a hostile shore. The commander of an 
amphibious assault is faced with the difficult talk of beginning the operation with 
zero combat power ashore. The challenge is to deliver sufficient forces to the land 
before the enemy can react in strength. 
While there are a number of enemy actions that can delay or disrupt the 
sequence of the assault, mines in very shallow water pose a special threat to the 
Navy-Marine Corps team. Very shallow water is any water less than forty feet in 
depth; a subset of very shallow water is the surf zone. We define the surf zone as 
the region from the ten foot curve to the high water mark. The threat of mines in 
the surf zone is twofold; current mine countermeasure equipment is unsuited for 
operations in these depths and the delivery systems for laying mines in the surf 
zone are very unsophisticated. On the one hand, US forces are not well suited to 
clearing minefields in the surf zone and on the other, any nation that has a truck 
can create a minefield in the surf zone. 
In addition to the general nature of the threat posed by mines in the surf 
zone, the thesis considers the effect oftide range and beach gradient. These 
factors are considered important as they affect the size of the task confronting the 
landing force commander. For example, a beach with flat gradient and small tide 
range would offer the defender el(tensive depth for laying minefie\ds and creating 
obstacles. Conversely, a beach of steep gradient and large tide range offers the 
defender less room to deploy barriers. 
Before developing the methodology used to study this problem, the scope 
of the thesis, as well as simplifying assumptions, must be understood. The thesis 
looks at one colored beach used to land a Battalion Landing Team (BLT). This 
landing team represents roughly one third ofthe combat power of the Marine 
Expeditionary Force (Forward) (l\tIEF(FWD» considered in this study. The 
expeditionary force is engaged in a lesser regional conflict (LRC), conducting 
amphibious operations in support ofthe theater campaign. The BLT is equipped 
with Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAA V) and Landing Craft, Air 
Cushion (LCAC). Because the BL T has AAA V's and LCAC's, amphibious 
assaults conducted over the horizon (OTH) are C<lnsidered. In this way, the effects 
of mines in the surf zone on operational maneuver from the sea (OMFTS) are 
studied. OMFTS embodies the efforts of the Navy-Marine Corps team to face the 
challenge oflittoral warfare. 
The minefield C<lnstructed for this thesis is very simple. It consists of two 
types of mines; tilt rod anti-tank mines and pressure fused anti-tank mines. We 
assume the mines are laid four meters apart, along a one kilometer front. The mine 
count for the surf zone is 1,000 mines per kilometer, while the minefield on the 
beach (from the high water mark landward) has a mine count of2,000 mines per 
kilometer. These assumptions create a notional minefield with known 
C<lmposition, density and dimensions. Further, using information from open 
sources, the effect of each mine type (tilt rod or pressure fused) on each assault 
craft (AAA V or LCAC) is calculated. Calculations show the AAA V is vulnerable 
to both mines, while the LCAC is only vulnerable to the tilt rod mines. After 
constructing the notional minefield, the effects oftide range and beach gradient 
were C<lnsidered. These factors were used to calculate the distance from the high 
water mark to the seaward edge of the surf zone minefield as well as the 
proportion of the minefield exposed at low tide. The proportion of exposure is of 
importance when C<lnsidering methods to breach the minefield. 
To breach a lane in the minefield, two methods are considered; explosive 
destruction and physical displacement. While explosives have been used 
successfully on land for several years, their employment in the surf zone is 
complicated by the water over the mines. If the explosion occurs on the surface, 
the blast is attenuated; insufficient force reaches the tilt rod mines. For this reason, 
the proportion ofthe minefield exposed at low tide is of interest to commander. 
xi 
The physical displacement of mines is commonly used on land, usually in the fonn 
of plows or rollers mounted on the front of a tanle. Obviously, this technique will 
not work in the surf zone. Separate from the two breaching methods is the idea of 
breaching by maneuver. To employ this idea, the commander determines that the 
density of the minefield is low enough to allow assault craft to cross the minefield 
without further reduction efforts. 
With the characteristics ofthe landing force determined, and the notional 
minefield constructed, attention is turned towards analysis of breaching concepts. 
The thesis considers three concepts; Breach by Maneuver (BBM), Helicopter 
Insert, Breach Seaward (HIBS) and Blast Rake Breach (BRB). As mentioned. 
BBM is employed when the commander feels the minefield density is low enough 
that reduction is not needed. HIBS is the current concept for breaching minefields 
in the surf zone. Helicopters insert a detaclunent of engineers who then clear a 
lane through the exposed minefields while a new type of mine rake is pulled by 
helicopter to breach the mines still covered by water. 
Analysis of these methods compares the advantages and disadvantages of 
each_ The models of the minefield are used to determine the level of reduction 
required to assure mission success while avoiding unacceptable casualties. Finally, 
the thesis concludes with a recommendation that development of the BRB concept 




The conduct of an amphibious assault is one of the most complex undertakings in 
modem warfare. The difficulties are multiplied by the presence of very shallow water 
(VSW) mines and mines in the surf zone (SZ). The Navy and Marine Corps must 
devclop solutions to this problem in a climate of austere defense budgets, while faced 
with a high operational tempo and frequent employment in contingency operations. This 
thesis will develop methods to compare three concepts for overcoming VSW/SZ 
minefields encountered during amphibious operations. 
B. SCOPE 
The thesis will consider amphibious operations in a Lesser Regional Conflict 
(LRC). The thesis will be limited to that portion of the beach from the ten foot curve to 
thc far side of minefield~ located near the bigh water mark. 
1. Friendly Forces 
A Marine Expeditionary Force, Forward (MEF(FWD», built around a 
Regimental Landing Team (RLT), is conducting operations in a LRC. The scenario used 
is takcn from the Project Culebra wargame (Ref. I :p. B-12]. A listing of the order of 
battle for the MEF(FWD) is found in Appendix A. 
2. Concept of Operations 
The landing force will employ LCAC's, Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicles 
(AAA V) and the OV-22 to conduct the initial assault. These assumptions are made to 
study the effect ofVSW and SZ mines on Over the Horizon (OTH) amphibio1L~ assaults. 
All landing craft will employ some form of precision navigation equipment 
(e.g., GPS). This assumption allows inclusion of electronic marking of the battlefield in 
the concepts considered. 
The principle of employing obstacles requires that tht:y be covt:red by fire or 
observation. In defending the landing beach, the t:nemy commandcr has the option of 
either meeting the assault echelon (AE) at the water line or laying some distance off .the 
beach in order to conduct a mobile defense. Currently, the Navy-Marine Corps team is 
striving to revitalize amphibious warfare by imbuing it with the principles of mam:uvcr 
warfare. When applied at the tactical level, maneuver warfare seeks out gaps in the 
enemy defenses. Accordingly, this study will assume the assault is planned with tht:se 
principles in mind; selected landing sites may bt: lightly ddended (they certainly will be 
undt:r observation), but the bulk of the enemy force will conduct a mobile defense. From 
this assumption, a logical concern for the CLF is the amount of time required to put some 
levd of combat power ashore. The traditional mark has been combat powt:r ashore at 
H+90 minutes. Though somewhat arbitrary, this milestone is suitable for the purpose of 
this study. The reader should recall thest: points when reviewing the Measures of 
Effectiveness (MOE) detailed in later chapters. 
Task units of the Amphibious Task Force (A TF) will clear from the ten foot 
curve seaward, as part of supporting operatio~. Although beyond the scope of this 
study, deception operations or covert mine clearing .would certainly affect tht: reaction 
time afforded the enemy. 
C. BACKGROUND 
The United States Navy, in conjunction with the United States Marine Corps, is 
turning its attention from the problems of open ocean warfare to the unique challenges 
presented by " ... joint operations conducted from the sea." [Ref. 2:p. 1 J. This new focus 
on operations conducted near the land comes under the heading of littoral warfare. As 
discussed in the White Paper, " ... From .. Tht: Sea", littoral warfare " ... poses varying 
technical and tactical challenges to Naval Forces." [Ref. 2:p. 4]. The White Paper goes 
on to detail the challenges facing amphibious operations: 
Some littoral threats--specifically mines, sea skimming cruise missiles and 
tactical ballistic missiles--L'lX the capabilitics of OUI current systems and force 
structure. Mastery of the littoral should not be presumed [Ref. 2:p. 4]. 
Conducting operations in littoral warfare, " ... requires a corresponding shift of 
emphasis toward accelerating the adaptation of existing forces to counter littoral threats." 
rRef. 2:p. 5]. Instead of fighting a large fleet action at sea, the Naval Service must now 
develop doctrine" ... ensuring effective transition from open ocean to littoral areas, and 
from sea to land and back, to accomplish the full range of potential missions" [Ref. 2:p. 
6]. 
I. Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFfS) 
As discussed above, the White Paper " ... From the Sea" shifts the focus of J'~avy 
tactical thought from open ocean warfare to the problems presented by littoral warfare. In 
a similar vein, OMITS moves Manne Corps tactical thought away from the amphibious 
campaigns of the Central Pacific (1943-45). While these campaigns embodied maneuver 
on the strategic level, in tactical execution they were often attrition warfare slugging 
matches, without latitude for maneuver (e.g., Tarawa and Iwo Jima). Such assaults are 
not acceptable now, neither to the nation nor to the personnel who would conduct them. 
Thc situation requires a new conceptual approach that acknowledges " ... structural 
intolerance of attrition and societal demands for inexpensive victory" [Ref. 3:p. 4]. The 
concept of OMFTS "Regards forcible entry as a National requirement" [Ref. 3:p. 11, and 
describes it as " ... a single seamless operation extending from a secure sea base across a 
hostile shore to dominate ... enemy center of gravity" [Ref. 3:p. 2]. Further, the Marine 
Corps holds that OMITS is ".,.the application of maneuver warfare principles to the 
maritime portion ofa theater campaign ... " rRef. 3:p. 1]. 
In maneuver warfare, the focus is on the enemy, not on specific pieces of terrain: 
"The objective of OFMTS is not seizure of the beach, but the rapid accomplishment of a 
campaign objective" rRef. 3:p. 5]. The commander seeks to identify the enemy center of 
gravity, whether this center is political, economic, cultural or military in narure. 
Communicating hislher wishes through the commander's intent, the CLF assigns missions 
to subordinates. The manner of execution of these missions is at the discretion of the 
subordinate. As each level understands the commander's intent two levels up, 
opponunities for exploitation are seized. The attacks are conducted to " ... break ihe 
cohesion and integration of enemy defenses while avoiding attrition oriented attacks" 
(Ref. 3:p. 5J. 
Maneuver warfare is often described as "going where the enemy isn't". 
However, this is wide of the marie "An operational concept of avoiding all opposition is 
neither imaginative nor credible, and it will not support our strategy" (Ref. 3:p. 4]. 
Rather, the Navy-Marine Corps team must retain the ability to fulfill " ... the requirement 
to strike at the heart of an invader or violent outlaw requires unquestioned ability to put 
power ashore" [Ref. 3:p. 3J. 
2. Maneuver Warfare and Tempo 
The key to understanding maneuver warfare is grasping the idea of operational 
tempo. This term relates the speed at which one combatant can carry out assigned 
missions to the speed at which the opponent executes missions. A useful mental 
construct for this concept is the Boyd Cycle. Developed by Colonel John Boyd, USAF 
(Ret.), it is also known as the OODA (Observation, Orientation, Decision, Action) Cycle. 
This theory holds that a commander must execute these four steps each time action is 
initiated. If one commander can execute the cycle faster than the opponent an advantage 
is gained. The enemy is faced with a deteriorating situation and the rate of deterioration 
is ever increasing. In the mind of the enemy commander, control of the situation is lost 
and defeat is imminent [Ref. 4:p. 137]. Since the side with faster operational tempo can 
execute missions and adapt to changing situations faster than the enemy, a great 
advantage accrues. This advantage should not be regarded lightly, for" .land battles 
seem to be largely won or lost in the minds of opposing commanders at ... tactical and 
operationallc:vels~ [Ref. 4:p. 47J. 
By framing the initial discussion of maneuver warfare in tenns of a meIltai 
process (DODA Loop), the reader may come to understand that maneuver means more 
than just timely movement on the battlefield. It is also necessary to consider the physical 
aspccts of maneuver warfare. Related to operational tempo is thc concept of operational 
mobility, defined as " ... the ability to move fast over considentblc distances (100-300 
miles) ... and arrive fit to fight" [Ref. 4:p. 42]. Maneuvcr warfare also speaks of surfaces 
and gaps; the physical interpretation is the manner in which the enemy holds the ground. 
A surfacc would be a stretch of terrain the enemy holds by occupation or controls by fire . 
A gap corresponds to a discontinuity in the enemy's defense. In maneuver warfare, the 
commander seeks to guide the Schwerpunkt, or main effort, through a gap towards the 
centcr of gravity. 
OMFTS uses the sea as a highway to conduct maneuver warfare ovcr the shore. 
~lt is maneuver al sea which makes maneuver from the sea so decisive ... " and thus 
" ... provides the real battlefield advantage to the amphibiously projected Marinc Air 
Ground Task Force" [Ref. 3:p. 31. 
3. OMFTS As a Two Stage Movement 
In the amphibiolL~ campaigns of World War II, the ships of the Amphibious 
Task Forcc (ATF) steamed close ashore 10 the landing beaches before launching the AE. 
Consider how such movement would appear on a chart; the strategic maneuver is denoted 
by the arrow connecting the port of embarkation to the landing beaches. The tip of the 
arrow terminates close to shore; it marks the line of departure for assault craft as they 
make the fina1 nm to the beach. 
In contrast, the lines on a chart noting an ATF conducting OMFTS would not 
tenninate as an arrow; rather, the tenninus might appear like a fan. This reflects the two 
stage movement of OMFTS. The A TF closes with landing beaches, but remains over the 
horizon. The distance off-shore is from 20 to 30 miles, not much more than the distance 
an AAA V can cover in a one hour swim. By launching an OTH assawt, the CATF/CLF 
confound the enemy's defensive preparations. Assuming there are a number,of equally 
attractive penetration points along a coast, thc encmy is unable to detennine which beach 
will be selected unti l the AE is actually ashore. These ideas arc best expressed 
graphically; see Figure 1. 
Figure 1. OMFTS as a Two Stage Movement. 
In Figure 1, Stage 1 represents the general location on the ATF shipping. It is 
over the horizon, 20 to 30 miles off the beach. Stage 2 represents the possible paths the 
AE can follow; the assault could come over any of the colored beaches. The arc denoted 
by the dashed line marks the section of coast vulnerable to an OMFTS assault. In the 
casc illustrated above, with the A TF 25 miles off shore, and the arc subtending 90·, the 
enemy commander must defend almost 40 miles of coastline. Also note, the A TF has the 
advantage of interior lines of communication within the dashed arc. 
There are several considerations that must be weighed when coordinating an 
OTH assault. As the ATF moves farther off shore, greater protection from shore based 
sensors and weapons is afforded. The threat of mines is greatly diminished with more 
water under the keel. Further, the defensive problem of the enemy is increased as more 
coastline falls within the operating fan of the ATF. However, moving too far off shore 
makes the swim time for the AAA V unacceptably long; operating endurance on the beach 
is affected and the physical condition of the Marines is degraded. Also, with greater 
distance, the cycle time for the LCAC from A TF to ClZ and back grows excessive. 
4. Current MCM CapabiJities 
As noted, the Navy-Marine Corps team is working to improve its ability to 
conduct littoral warfare, especially power projection through amphibious assault·,. by 
recasting doctrine. However. there remain several problems that must bc addressed 
through changcs to tactics, techniques or equipment. One such problem is that of mines 
in VSW and in the SZ. In order that the promise of operational tempo offered by 
OMFTS be realized. new capabilities must be developed: 
"Viable mine reconnaissance and in stride clearance capabilities will be 
critical to success in future amphibious operations" [Ref. 3:p. 12]. 
To appreciate the effort required in developing these capabilities, the reader 
must understand the capabilities and limitations of current mine countenneasure forces . 
To begin, let in stride clearance mean that the mine problem is handled in ways " ... that 
allow amphibious forces to launch when and where they had planned ... their speed of 
advance no way impeded by a mine threat. .. ~ [Ref. 5:p. 59]. According to Lee M. Hunt, 
in the April 199.1 issue of Proceedings, the current surface and airborne mine 
countermeasures (MCM) forces can clear mines in to water depths as shallow as 10 to 15 
feet [Ref. 5:p. 60]. To be sure, additional equipment, primarily C4 I, Inverse Synthetic 
Aperture Radar and GPS must be fitted to current platforms. Further, the relationship 
between the MCM forces and other fleet elements must be altered to reflect the world 
class threat posed by mines. Within the MCM community, how resources are aliocated 
to intelligence and surveillance must be adjusted. A very useful model for this 
adjustment is contained in a paper by George W. Conner, Mark A. Ehlers and Knealc T. 
Marshall: Countering Short Range Ballistic Missiles [Ref. 6]. 
While current MCM forces can be modified to handle the threat of mines from 
the 10 foot curve seaward, for the 5Z and the beach" ... there is no acceptable procedure 
for clearing mines ... " [Rcf. 5:p. 60). The lack of an acceptable procedure and the absence 
of a methodology to assess alternative solutions forms the basis of this thesis. 
5. Current Countermine Concept Development 
The Marine Corps Comhat Development Command (MCCDq at Quantico, 
Virginia is responsible for developing new methods of warfighting. Efforts regarding 
developments in littoral warfare are embodied by various projects. Part of this effort is 
represented by the Culebra Project, a series ofwargame~ and analytical studies designed 
to bring new vigor to amphibious warfare. 
Another program at MCCDC is the Advanced Concept Test Demonstration 
(ACTO). This Joint MCM study will " ... integrate existing capabilities and ongoing 
programs ... currently funded into a cohesive and synchronized effort" [Ref. 7:p. 1]. The 
ACTD is a multi.year program, comhining actual exereises with distributed interactive 
simulations to demonstrate the capability to " ... conduct seamles~ amphibious MCM 
operations during Joint Naval·Land comhat operations" [Ref. 8:p. 3J. An important point 
made by the bricf on ACTD is the recognition that there is no silver bullet. A tool box of 
tactics and techniques must be developed to overcome the threat of mines in VSW and 
the SZ [Ref. 8:p. 22] . 
At the Mine Warfare Command, improvements to MCM capabilities are pursued 
in several projects. Kits that give the LCAC the ability to conduct MCM missions arc a 
near·term, high priority program. There are also efforts to develop remotely operated 
vehicles with a fiber optic cable tether, autonomous underwater vehicles and Wlffianned 
air cushion mine sweepers. However, these latter programs have uncertain funding 
futures [Ref. 9]. During a briefmg by Captain Craig Sackett USN, of the Mine Warfare 
Command, a realistic appraisal of near tenn (zero to ten years) capabilities was offered. 
In this brief the point was again made that no capability exists to clear mincs in stride 
between the 10 foot curve and the high water mark. Exercises testing the near term 
concept (i.e., a helo assault seizes a beachhead, then engineer~ clear a lane seaward) 
showed it to be difficult to execute. The brief concludes that more work is needed and 
additional tactics will have to be developed [Ref. 10}. 
This discussion of current initiative~ leads to the conclusion that current systems 
and tactics can be adapted to reduce the risk of mines from the 10 foot curve seaward. 
However, mines in the surf zone could be the real show stoppcr in an amphibious assault 
TIlls thesis will approach thc challengc of such mines: nThe risk that is not eliminated by 
improved capabilities is confronted with imagination and boldness ... " [Ref. 3:p. 7). 
II. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
A. PROJECTED THREAT 
1. Likelihood of Minefields 
When planning an OMFTS, the prudent commander will assume that minefield.s 
will be encountered, even in the absence of intelligence, because shallow water mines and 
beach mines are becoming ubiquitous. Mines offer an extremely cost effective way to 
counter the threat of amphibious assaults. Also, the nations of the former USSR and the 
Warsaw Pact are short of hard currency. Selling their stockpiles of anti-invasion mines is 
one way to quickly generate income. Finally, potential adversaries have noted the 
difficulties mines caused the US Navy during the Kuwaiti tanker re-flagging opemtions, 
as well as the effect of Iraqi mines on the Navy-Marine Corps team during Opemtion 
Desert Stonn. 
2. Time, OMFfS and Minefields 
Successful implementation of an OMFTS requires that minefields be reduced 
expeditiously. The current standard is six hours, with the operation starting four hours 
before BMNT [Ref. 10). A commander executing an OMFTS cannot tolerate another 
Wosan harbor; " ... unlike past amphibious operations, we will not concede tactical 
surprise and will take actions to deny the enemy early warning ... " [Ref. J I: slide 10]. 
Further, as the ability of the Navy-Marine Corps team to exploit the advantages of 
OMFTS increases, the time available for pre-assaul~reaching will decrease and may be 
eliminated [Ref. 12:p. 10.11]. Thus, OMFTS drives the requirement to develop in-stride 
breaching. Mines in. the SZ are not easily located by current sensors, especially mines 
that bury themselves in the bottom. Additionally, these mines tend to be smaller and 
their density greater. If the clearing technique locates and destroys mines one at a time, 
this greater density increases the amount of time required to clear the mines. 
IO 
The presence, or suspected presence, of mineficlds will weigh heavily on the 
CATF/CLF as they plan the OMFTS. Maintaining surprise and operational mobility 
could become mutually exclusive goals. Mineflclds limit the options available to the 
commander; if the ATF does not have the ability to overcome them, OMFTS is not 
possible. 
3. Effect of Mines on Assault Craft 
The LeAr, though it rides on a cushion of air, stiU traDsntits a pressure footprint 
and a magnetic signature into the water. However, when the mine detonates more than 
30 feet below the surface, the craft's speed protects it from blast damage by outrunning 
the plume of the mine. This protection is provided. If detonation occurs at shallower 
depths, the plume broaches the surface before the LCAC can move a safe distance and 
catastrophic damage occurs. This means the LeAC is vulnerable to anti-landing 
influence and tilt rod mines in the 5Z and on the beach. Based on open source 
infonnation, anti-tank mines fused by the pressure or magnetic signature of passing 
vehicles are considered. This study assumes that anti-tank mines do not pose a threat to 
the LCAC on cushion. Finally, we assume the design of the LCAC skirts is sufficiently 
robust to withstand the blast of anti-personnel mines. 
The AAA V, as a displacement hull craft. sends a pressure and magnetic 
footprint into the surrounding water. Its speed in the water (top speed is 25 knots) does 
not allow it to outrun the plume of a bottom moored mine. Tbe craft has a draft of six 
feet with the potential to fuse all of the mines discussed above, particularly the anti-tank 
mines. Even if the AAA V does not suffer a catastrophic kill from an anti-tank mine, it 
will probably suffer a mobility kill from damage to its tracks. However, the hull and 
running gear are able to withstand the blast from anti-persOlUlei mines. 
The other assault craft carried by the ships of the ATF (e.g., LCU) are all 
displacement hulls. They are vulnerable to the entire range of mines. 
4. The Typical Minefield 
Though mines can be laid in many patterns, with varying density, a typical 
pattern for the anti-invasion mine threat is pictured in Figure 2, below: 
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Figure 2. Anti-Invasion Mine Threat. 
Minefields of this pattern are very easy to establish. They require minimal 
technology for the mine delivery system (e.g., they can be laid from a truck at low tide). 
B. SYSTEM DESIGN OBJECTIVES 
The ideal MCM system will be simple and cheap, yet able to ensure mission 
success while addressing the concerns detailed in the section below. In particular, the 
Marine COlpS wishes to mount the MCM system on the AAA V. thus ensuring the 
breaching force arrives at the same time as the AB. Such a system would also eliminate 
the need for additional vehicles [Ref. 11: slide 13]. 
1. Areas of Concern 
Any candidate system must have minimal impact on the lift requirements of the 
MAGTF. As space onboard amphibious shipping is already at a premium, the footprint, 
cube and weight penalties of a new system will be weighed carefully against the benefits 
offered by the system. 
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Although budget forecasting is very difficult, it is reasonable to assume thai 
current budget trends will continue. For MCM systems, this means that high risk 
approaches are ill advised. Rather, systems must be developed using proven technology 
or afflhe shelf items. 
Additionally, there is the problem of diversion of critical assets. Since new 
MCM systems have to satisfy the foregoing concerns, an obvious approach would 
develop MCM capability as an add on kit for a system currently fielded. While this is a 
prudent course, such development must not overcommit critical mobility assets. For 
example, the Mine Warfare Command is fielding kits for the LCAC. These kits give the 
LCAC a MCM capability; when installed, the LCAC is designated a MCAC. However, a 
MCAC is unable to perform the LCAC mission simultaneously. At some point in the 
amphibious assault this could create a shortfall in landing craft. 
With the heavy emphasis OMFTS places on operational tempo and surprise, any 
system must be designed with these tactical realities in mind. It is of little use for the 
ATF to have a MCM that is 100% effective, ifit gives the enemy sufficient time to react 
strongly. 
C. V ARJABLES 
1. Tide Conditions 
A major difficulty with mines in the SZ is the inability of current sensors to 
detect their presence. This is due to the attenuating affects of the water and surf. In the 
near term, the most effective surveillance tools for this problem are visual techniques. 
Their effectiveness is increased if some means of cueing is available. Mines are often 
laid on and among anti-boat obstacles. These obstacles are uncovered to varying degrees 
during low tide. The range of the tide will impact on visual cueing and thus on the 
probability of detection. 
One current techn1que for overcoming minefields on land relies on explosives. 
Charges create an over pressure to fuse anti-tank mines or destroy the mines by 
sympathetic detonation. For this technique to work on mines in the SZ, the problem of 
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getting the explosive force transmitted to the mines must be overcome. The range of the 
tide will have an effect on this technique. 
2. Beach Gradient 
This topic relates to the extent of the minefield and any obstacles present. A 
short, steep beach will not offer the defender much room to lay mines. Conversely, a flat 
beach will allow for extensive mining. Therefore, the beach gradient directly affects the 
work load on the MCM effort and the danger to the AB. 
D. MEASURES OF EFFECllVENESS 
t. MOEt 
Time required to clear a given number of lanes of a given width. TIlls MOE is 
useful for discriminating between systems when considering various landing tactics. For 
example, the CLF may decide to land at multiple beaches; in this case MOE I would 
favor the most flexible system. 
2. MOE 2 
Time required to land the AB, including clearance time. As a measure of 
performance for this MOE, the probability that the number of round trips performed by 
each LCAC exceeds some minimum level is calculated. If necessary, the losses suffered 
by the assault craft can be used for further discrimination. A system that creates boat 
lanes in a short period of time but leaves many mines for the assault craft is of little use. 
This MOE will screen out such systems. 
3. MOE3 
Reaction time afforded to the enemy. This MOE will measure the amount of 
time that passes between the creation of the boat lanes and the beginning of the landing 
operation. TIlls MOE is somewhat subjective, in that an evaluation must be made 
regarding the warning given the enemy. For example, a system may create a boat Jane by 
delivering an explosive charge. If this charge is detonated during strikes on beach 
installations, the enemy may not notice and therefore not receive any hint that a landing is 
inuninent. MOE 3 is aL~o scenario dependent. The breadth of front defended and the 
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effectiveness of deception operations become important in estimating enemy reaction 
time. The reader can see how changing the scenario would affect the outcome of MOE 3. 
4. MOE 4 
Combat power ashore at H+90 minutes. The arbitrary nature of this MOE has 
been acknowledged, but it is still a useful measure to gauge the effect of a MCM system 
on landing the AE. 
5. MOE 5 
The cost 10 conduct the OMFTS; based on the expected value of a random 
variable thai counts losses of LCACs. The expected value is converted to a dollar figure 
by using an average unit cost in FY -94 dollars. This MOE focuses on LCAC's for two 
reasons; their high unit cost and their impact on a succcssfullanding by the AE. 
6. Use of MOE's in Analysis 
This thesis will use all five MOE's listed when comparing breaching concepts. 
The data developed to measure all of these MOE's is affected to some degree by the 
scenario used. The measures are especially sensitive to the mine threat encountered. 
A complete assessment of the costs associated with an OMITS must consider all 
losses. The loss of an aircraft, either fixed wing or helicopter, has a major impact on the 
total cost of the OMFTS. However, this thesis considers only the problems presented by 
minefields. Minefields bave an indirect impact on aircraft; only 10 the extent that the 
MCM mission exposes them to enemy anti...aircraft (AA) systems. This thesis does not 
develop any models of the enemy AA; hence aircraft losses are not included in the cost of 
an OMITS. The nexl section describes three breaching concepts considered in this 
thesis. 
E. BREACmNG CONCEPTS 
I. Breaching Versus Clearing 
Although these two tenus are often used interchangeably, they have distinct 
meanings. This thesis is concerned with breaching concepts; the reader must understand 
what breaching means. 
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Breaching is a combat operation of making a safe lane for annored vehicles 
to go through a minefield; clearing is an uncontested operation of removing or 
destroying all the mines in the field [Ref. 13:p. 1]. 
2. Breaching By Maneuver (BOM) 
As noted, breaching is a very different concept from clearing. In choosing to 
employ BBM, the risk of losing personnel and equipment to mines is weighed against the 
cost of accepting the operational restrictions imposed by the minefield. 
The Navy and Marine Corps look at breaching from very different perspectives. 
The CLF will accept the loss of a few mobility assets to gain maneuver room. The 
CATF, however, must contemplate the loss ofbigh value assets (e.g., LCACs) against the 
outcome of accepting denial of landing areas [Ref. 14:p.4]. 
Before proclaiming "Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead!" the CATF and CLF 
must decide if the risk of bulling through an unreduced minefield is worth the cost. 
Consideration of the decision criteria developed from model analysis in Chapter IV will 
assist in this process. 
3. Helicopter Insert, Breacb Seaward (HIBS) 
HIBS is a second breaching concept, utilizing a helo-borne force to execute a 
vertical envelopment. The objective is located on the far side of the beach minefield. 
While the infantry establishes blocking positions, engineer elements breach a lane 
seaward. Once the lane is safe, assault craft (LCAC, AA V) land the remainder of the AE. 
4. Blast, Rake, Breach (BRB) 
The third method is BRB. In the BRB concept, explosives, delivered by air, are 
used to create a lane in the minefields not covered by water. A rake, or rakes, pulled by 
heJicopter{s), is used to breach the mines in the surf zone. AA Y's pass through this 
breach and begin prosecuting the OMFTS. Engineer elements, landing by AA Y, then use 
the rake, deposited by the helicopter on the far side of the beach minefield, to expand the 
beach lane. The engineers use their AAY's to pull the rake(s). Once the beach lane is 
expanded to the required 45 meters, LCAC's are brought ashore. 
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BRB is a refmement of an idea put forth by a MITRE Corporation study rRef. 
IS}. The key to BRB is the Anti-Snag Plowing System. A description ofthc plow, taken 
from the MITRE Corporation study, is found at Appendix 8. 
Using explosives to breach minefields is a common technique. The Army's 
Ballistic Research Laboratory bas devc:loped a model, [Ref. l3]. of fuel air explosives 
(F AE) as a breaching tool. Their model gives the conunander a planning tool to calculate 
the level of effon required to attain a given level of breaching. Accordingly, this 
technique is incorporated in BRB. 
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m. EVALUATION MODELS AND DATA 
A. THE ASSAULT ECHELON OF THE MEF (FWD) 
Landing the Assault Echelon (AE) of the MEF (FWD) takes place over colored 
landing beaches. Usually one Battalion Landing Team (BLT) is assigned to a landing 
beach. A BL T represents approximately one third of the combat power of the MEF 
(FWD) in the scenario used by this thesis. Figure 3, Colored Beach Schematic. is taken 
from the briefby Captain Sackett USN [Ref. 10]. 
Figura 3. Colored Beach Schematic. 
To land the AE, the ATF has 30 LCAC's and 36 AA V's. The thesis assumes 
landing the AE will require 90 LCAC loads. This assumption is based on the lift capacity 
of the LCAC and the Task Organization of the MEF (FWD). Consider one colored 
beach; a single BL T will land here, using ten LCAC's and thirteen AA V's to move the AE 
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ashore. The munber of LCAC loads required is taken to be 30 (Le., one tIllrd of the 90 
needed by the MEF (FWD)). 
B. THE MINEFIELD 
1. Composition and Density 
The composition of the minefield will vary with the opponent. Density is 
inversely proportional to depth. For tills thesis, worst case densities are assumed. Figure 
4, Notional Beach Profile, notes these denmties and list~ typical mines used in the SZ and 






Figure 4. Notional Beach Profile. 
2. Depth of Mine fields 
Assume that mines are laid four meters apart, the minimum distance that 
prevents sympathetic detonation. For a count of 1000 mineslkilometer, this gives four 
rows with 250 mines per row. Such a minefield would he 1000 meters wide by 16 meters 
deep; with a density of 0.0625 mines/square meter. In a similar manner, 2000 
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minesJkilometer results in a minefield 1000 meters by 32 meters and a density of 0.0625 
mines/square meter. 
Table 1. Minefield Characteristics 
Surf Zone Beach 
Count(KM 1,000 2,000 
O:epth(m) 16 32 
DensItY 0.0625 0.0625 
3. Traversing the Minefield 
The mines are positioned in each field to fonn a homogeneous Poisson process 
with mine density rm (mines/meter). This implies that the distribution of mines in any 
subset of the minefield is Poisson with mean:::: (rm )X(Area). Further, the number of 
mines in disjoint areas are independent random variables [Ref. 16:p. 2]. 
Assume the vehicles (LCAC or AA V) travel through the minefield in column 
and let the random variable D equal the number of vehicles destroyed trying to traverse. 
Then D has the distribution: 
P[D=dJ = [Exp(-r:A,W[r:AJ'/d! 
~=(vehicle actuation widtht(length of breach) 
C. THE CIRCULATION MODEL 
1. Flow 
During the assault, personnel and material must flow to the beach. That portion 
of the effort delivered by air avoids the mines in the SZ and on the beach, while the 
AA V's must traverse the minefields only once on their way to subsequent operations 
ashore. The LCAC's, however, must circulate between the beach and the ships of the 
ATF. This model is suggested by Conner et. al., [Ref. 6:p. 6-9]. 
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2. Model 
For the LCAC, a successful cycle is defined as surviving the transit of the 
minefields and the delivery of its load. The cycle begins at the ATF shipping. It then 
follows that the first cycle is defined as the transit from the ships to the beach. All 
subsequent cycles include the round trip from ship to beach and back 10 ship. 
Let the random variable Ci count the number of successful cycles by the jtt> 
LCAC. In Figurc 5 below, probabilities are defined as follows: 
Q~ = P[transit fm ATF to CLZ] = (1-p1)(1-p2)(1-p3) 
Q B = P[transit fm CLl to ATF] = (1-p4)(1-p5)(1-p6) 




Figure 5. Circulation Model. 
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3. Distribution of C1 
ffthe ith LCAC is sunk on the first cycle, it delivers no cargo. Ifit survives the 
first cycle, it will continue to deliver loads until the assault is complete or it is sunk. 
Then C j has the distribution: 
p[e; = n] = 1 - Q ... n = 0 
p[e; = n] = Q ... (Q ... Qs) .... 1(1-Q ... Qs) n = 1, 2, 3, ... 
E[CJ = Q ... /1-QAQ S 
4. Total Loads Delivered 
The total nwnber of loads delivered during the assault is the random variable, 
TL. ForTL: 
TL =1:; C1 i = 1, 2, ... n 
E[TL) = nE[CJ 
where n = number of LCAC's available 
D. THE INTERACTION OF TIDE AND GRADIENT 
1. Beach Gradient 








The range ofihe tide on a beach depends on many factors. This range can playa 
significant role in planning amphibious operations. For purpose of analysis, a sample of 
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tidal ranges was taken from literature [Ref. 18]. Using the fact that a tidal range greater 
than 15 feet is rarely seen, [Ref. 19;p. 23], the classifications in Table 3 are established: 
all entries are in meters. 






The chamcteristic gradient and tidal range for the notional beach interact to 
expose varying amounts of beach at low tide. The entries in Table 4, below, indicate the 
amount of beach exposed. The distance is from the High Water Mark (HWM) to Mean 
Lower Low Water (MLLW), in meters. 
Table 4. Beach Ex osure 
ShMilP lnannedlate Flat 
LOW 11.22 14.96 22.44 
Medium Bl.S1 108.68 163.02 
""'. 
151 .14 201.52 302.28 
E. DATA 
1. Assault Craft Costs 
To develop data for MOE 5, costs for losses incurred during an amphibious 
assault are compared. Typically costs are listed as averages for a given fiscal year. To 
allow direct comparison, costs are adjusted for inflation. Entries in Table 5 are in FY-94 
dollars [Ref. 20]. 





2. Dimensions of Assault Craft 
The model used to analyze the probability of traversing a mine field uses the 
vehicle's area as a parameter. For the LCAC, this area equals path length times activation 
width. 
For the AAV, Iwo values are given; one for total area and om: for track area. 
The fonner is used 10 detennine the probability of detonating a tilt rod (TR) mine, while 
the latter is used to delcnnine the probability of detonating a pressure fused anti-tank: 
(PFA T) mine. Note thai throughout this thesis, the dimensions and capacities of the 
AA V7-Al (currently in inventory) are used as proxies for the AM V. The infonnation in 
Table 6 comes from open sources; OH 7-15 for the LCAC, [Ref. 211, and Jane's Armour 









3. Minefield Operational Data and Location 
For the purpose of analysis, the minefields consist of one of two mine types: TR 
or PFAT. The TR minefield is located in the SZ while PFAT mines are on the beach. 








Table 7 Mine Data 
TR P·FAT 
Rod Deflection 175 Kg pressure 
1 to 5 meters NI. 
1.05 meters Nt. 
NI. n9 centimeter' 
NI. 0.22 Kg/cm'" 
The model used in this thesis assumes the seaward edge of the beach minefield 
parallels the HWM, with successive rows of mines laid landward. The location of mines 
in the SZ must meet two criteria: (a) respect operating depth (b) at high tide, the tip of the 
operating rod must be within 1.65 meters of the surface to ensure displacement hull craft 
are attacked. Fib'1U"e 6 portrays these criteria: 
Figure 6. Location of TR Mines. 
Thus, the location of the SZ minefield is affected by the tide and beach gradient 
interaction. Table 8, SZ Minefield Location and Exposure, gives the distance in meter:; 
from the HWM to the seaward edge of thc minefield. Thc figure in brackets gives the 
proportion of the minefield exposed at low tide. 
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Table 8. SZ Minefield Location and Exposure 
Steep Intennedlate Flat 
Low Tide Range 89.1 [O.O[ 118.8[0.0] 178.2 [0.0] 
Me(1.TideRange 89.1 [.53J 118.8 [.37] 178.2 [.05J 
High Tlde Range 89.1 [1.0] 118.8 [1.0] 178.2 [1.0] 
4. Recovery Rate 
When planning an amphibious assault, installations or systems that have a fast 
recovery rate are scheduled for attack close to H-Hour. Using typical Warsaw-Pact 
equipment. Table 9. Minelaying Rates, was established [Ref. 23]. Assuming a delivery 
rate of 12 mines/minute, the entries reflect the efforts of one vehicle, operating at 
maximum speed, laying a minefield with a one kilometer front. The last row lists the 
time required to establish the worst case minefield, where rm = 0.0625 mines/square 
meter. 
Actfon 
Table 9. Minelaying Rates 
$piled Tl. 
SurfaC8Uy 10 KM'Hour 6 Minutes 
BU;Y.Minea 3 KMlHour 20 Minutes 





IV. ANALYSIS OF BREACHING CONCEPTS 
A. MODEL ANALYSIS 
1. Introduction 
Before proceeding to the analysis of the breaching concepts, insights offered by 
the circulation and beach models should be considered. These insights are used to 
develop a breakpoint decision criteria for employing B8M and to assess the level of 
effort required for BRB. 
2. Circulation Model 
In this model, the random variable C( counts the number of cycles by the jtn 
LCAC. The values realized by C II and the associated value of TL, gauge the success or 
failure of the landing force. Recall thaI: 
E[CJ = 0../1-0 ... 0 8 
Where C, = (1-pl)(1-p2)(1-p3) 
C, = (1-p4)(1-p5)(1-p6) 
For analysis purposes assume: 
pl=p3=p4=p6=O 
By this assumption the mines in VSW areassumcd cleared and the PFAT mines 
are treated as before. From this the expression for E{CJ is simplified: 
E[CJ = Q ... /1_Q ... 2 
As this problem in constructed, ten LCAC's must deliver 30 loads to land the 
AE. The, likelihood of mission success, separate from concern over losses, is gauged by 
the realized value ofCI. IfCI > 3, for all i, i=1,2,3 ... 10, the AE will gel ashore. 
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Let the random variable X count the number of LCAC's that survive three or 
more cycles. Then X-Binomial (10, P[C1 > 3]). Define acceptable losses as 20% of the 
force, or two LCAC's. From this it is a straightforward process to detennine· the 
probability of acceptable losses: 
P[LCAC loss < 2] = P[X > 8] 
For analysis, the circulation model is considered with parameters. For various 
specified values of Q ... , what are the consequences? Table 10 gives the result of such 
specifications. The required reduction in rm (from the worst case density of 0.0625 
mines/square meter) is calculated from P[Successful Traverse] = Q ... ;< P[D:= 0]. 
Table 10 Sensitivity of Model to QA 
Q, 0.85 0.90 0.95 0.99 
E(C, 3.06 4.74 9.74 49.74 
'£!Ttl 30.6 47.4 97.4 497.4 
l'{o,>3l 0.4021 0.5715 0.7689 0.9508 
P(LCAClO.seas2] 0.0127 0.1256 0.5629 0.9869 
FJedUctionofr;. 96.87% 99.27% 99.64% 99.93% 
Now the CA TF and CLF must determine what actions they can take to ensure 
mission success (e.g., P{C1 > 3]) while reducing the risk of unacceptable losses (e.g., 
P[LCAC losses> 3]). Before exploring breaching concepts, analysis of the beach 
model is in order. 
3. Beaeh Model 
"This model explores the interaction between tide range and beach gradient, as it 
affects the amphibious assault. Three points made by FMFM 8·3, Advanced Naval Base 
Defense, are noted [Ref. 24:p. 47]: 
Conditions for the installation of underwater obstacles are favorable if beach 
gradient is flat, bottom fmn, the tide range small and the surf mild. 
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Flat gradients permit extensive use of obstacles, while steep gradients limit 
their use. 
Small tidal range permits continuous concealment of obstacles below the 
surface while a large tidal range docs not. 
For the CATF and CLF, the quantity of interest (QOI), is the distance from the 
seaward s ide of the SZ minefield to the far side of the beach minefield. This QOI, Path 
Length, is indicative of the effort required to achieve a breach. As path length increases, 
two cases can exist. In Case I, the defender has an infinite supply of mines and continues 
to lay worst case density minefields (rm '" 0.0625 mines/square meter) along the entire 
path length. In Case II the defender has a fini te supply of mines intends to lay them along 
the entire path length. The entries in Table II are for the notional beach with the worst 
case density minefields. All distances are in meters. 
Under the conditions of Case I, rill is constant while A; continues to increase. 
Recall thaI A; equals (Craft Width)X(path Length). From this, Q" decreases 
exponentially as a function of A,. This case is of little interest, as few defenders have an 
infinite supply of mines. 
For Case 11, the defender, with a finite supply of mines, must consider the effect 
of any increases in minefield depth. Assuming the mines are laid equi-distant from one 
another, increased path length reduces rBi• However, this does not have a proportional 
effect on the probability of successful transit. This is due to the longer path a vehicle 
mw;1 travel to clear the minefield. 
To illustrate this point, consider the values in Table II. If32 meters (the depth 
of the PF AT minefield) is subtracted from each value, the result is the maximum depth 
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the TR minefield ean occupy and still be submerged at high tide. The other values in 
Table 12 are based on a minefield one kilometer wide, witb 1,000 mineslkilometer. 
Table 12. Effect of Path Length on r 
SteeP Intermediate Flat 
PjthLeogth 89.1 m 166m 178.2m 
Spacing 9.5m 13m !304m 
r..; 0.0111 0.0061 0.0056 
A qualitative analysis of the beach model leads to tbe conclusion that the real 
problem lies somewhere between Case I and Case II. When facing a longer path length, 
it is reasonable to expect the defender to lay more minefields, of greater depth, along the 
path. Finally the beach model considers the effect of tide range. For smaller tide ranges, 
thc amount of obstacle exposure decreases. Since current efforts for detecting and 
breaching obstacles are stymied by water, small tide ranges present more danger to the 
AE. Figure 7 graphically expresses this interplay. 
LARGE TIDE RANGE 
S'l'EEP G9.AO:IENT 
DCBEASED PATH LElfGTH---7 
Figure 7. Tide Range-Gradient Interplay. 
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B. B8M CONCEPT ANALYSIS 
I. Minefield Analysis 
Recall the planar Poisson model of the minefield. The random variable D counts 
the number of mines encountered as a vehicle ttaverses the minefield. The probability 
distribution of 0 is: . 
P[D=d) = [ExP(-'m -"W[('m -,,)'Id!) d = 0,1,2 ... 
Where fm = mineslsquare meter 
A, = Area traversed by vehicle 
This model considers two types of mines; TR and PFAT. As discussed 
previously, A; is modified 10 reflect the applicable vehicle width. For a single vehicle 
traversing the notional minefield, the P[Successful Traverse] = P[D=O). For each type of 
mine (TR, PF AT) and vehicle (LCAC, AA V), the PfD='Ol is listed in Table 13. 
Table 13. P[S\ngle Vehicle Successful Traverse] 
TR PFAT 
LCAC 5.8 X 1cr' 1.0 
MY 0.04 0.12 
The entries of Table 13 suggest that BBM of the notional minefield is ill 
advised. However, a situation akin to Case II of the beach model may arise, creating the 
opportunity to execute a BBM. To further consider this point, let the random variable 
SLCAC count the number of LCAC's that successfully execute a BBM in column. For ease 
of modeling, assume if an a'\S8uJt craft (AAV or LCAC) strikes a mine, it is obliterated 
and the others in column can proceed along the intended track. For this model there are 
ten LCAC's to traverse the minefield. The relation between ~ and D, the distribution 
of mines in the path, is expressed as: 
SlCA(; = 10-0 
Similarly, the success of AA V's in executing a BBM in column is expressed as: 
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8 ""v = 13-0 
Considering the expected values of these random variables for a traverse of a TR 
minefield, we have: 
E[SlC,t,d=E[10-0J=10-E[0] 
E[SM,]=E[13-D]=13-E[D] 
2, Breakpoint Decision Criteria 
To develop this criteria, first consider the column of LCAC's transiting a TR 
minefield in the SZ. Assume the defender is represented by Case II of the beach model. 
That is, a finite number of mines must be planted along the entire path length, whlle 
defending one kilometer of coastline. Depending on the beach gradient, this minefield 
will vary in depth. 
The analysis begins with a desired end state; the required number of deliveries 
achleved with acceptable losses. From this information, using expected values, the 
equation is solved for rm. The value of rO' is used, in tum, to find the exact probability of 
acceptable losses as well as the mine count for the beach in question. These steps are 
expressed mathematically: 
E[S~ = 10 - E[D] 
E[D]=10-8=2 
(recall acceptable losses are < 2) 
E[D] = 2 = (rm )"(A,) 
rm = 2/(14.36)"'(Path Length) 
Determining Exact Probability: 
P[SlC.t.C > 8J = P[O <2] = 1:, P[O = ij i = 0, 1, 2 
Determining Mine Count: 
Mine Count = (rm t(Path Length)*(1,OOO m) 
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Using the steps described above, the tables following were developed. Note, to 
express the desired end .<;tate for the AAV, the model uses: 
E[SM'] = 13 - E[D[: E[DJ = 3 
Also, the AAV uses one width (3.27 m) for TR mines and another (1.09 m) for 
PFAT mines. Finally, asswne that the depth for PFAT minefields beyond the HWM is 
the same as minefields in the SZ. 
Table 14. Breakpoint lor LCAC: TR mines in SZ 
Path Length P[D:!i:2] Mine Count 
.1 Meters .0016 0.6639 143 
66Metert; .OOOS 0.7018 133 
, 78.2Met8i'a 
.00078 0.6778 139 
Table 15. Breakpoint for AAV: TR mines in SZ 
;1 Metera .0103 0.6470 917 
166 Meters .0055 0.6504 913 
78'.:2Metera .0051 0.6535 907 
Table 16. Breakpoint for AAV: PFAT mines on Beach 
PatbUngth PID§J) MI,, 'COl.lnt 
89~1 ,Meterw' .0309 0.6470 2753 
166MeliMS .0166 0.6466 2755 
178.2,Met.". .0154 0.6492 2752 
Determining a decision criteria from the above tables is straightforward in 
theory, but difficult in execution. For example, the CATF/CLF may decide to execute a 
BBM if the chances of unacceptable losses is less than 40%. Now the problem becomes 
one of detennining the mine density, which is a function of the mine count, the mine 
spacing and the dimensions of the minefield. Therefore, making a recommendation to 
execute a BBM requires accurate, up to date intelligence on the mine threat. Current 
sen<;QfS are limited in their ability 10 provide such information. 
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It is important to note the required reduction (86%) of TR mine:; in the SZ 
necessary for the LCAC's to execute a BBM. This fact should serve as a cue for focusing 
intelligence gathering efforts, as LCAC's are a key component of OMFTS. 
3. Olher Considerations 
BBM has two important advantages over mBS and BRB. First, it offers the 
best chance for tactical surprise. It offers the defender no warning that an attack is 
imminent. Second, it does not cause any aircraft (helo or fixed wing) additional exposure 
to enemy AAA or SAM's. 
The drawback to BBM is the critical role rm plays in detennining its success. 
Accurately evaluating rm is an extremely difficult task given the systems currently in use. 
Finally. note that BBM does not employ the circulation model. It assumes that 
lane clearing will follow the breach and initial lodgment ashore. 
C. BRB CONCEPT ANALYSIS 
1. Minefield Reduction Before Breaching 
To breach the TR and PFAT minefields considered in this thesis, two techniques 
exist: explosive detonation or physical displacement. The advantages and disadvantages 
of each are summarized below; 
Table 17. Minefield Breaching Techniques 
-Standoff distance -Cumbersome to bring to bear 
-Speed of breach -Lane less than 100% clear 
-Defeats all types of mines -Danger to system 
-Slow speed of advance 
Mines in the S2 present a unique challenge. Neither sea nor land MCM 
techillques are well suited for this application. Further, the minefield at the HWM is not 
easily engaged by current land MCM systems; the near side of the minefield (i.e., the SZ) 
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does not offcr the required maneuver space. BRP. sceks to mecl these challenges by 
combining both techniques to exploit the advantages (;I: each. 
The minefield model offers insight into the value of reducing on before 
attempting a traverse. Table 18 lists the P[Suceessful Traverse] by a single vehicle for 
different levels of reduction to rm: 
Toole 18. P[Successful Traverse With Reduction 
TH m m PFAT PFAT PFAT 
~01."r .. • 15*r. ,01·r .. .1*". .1 S·r_ 
LeAC 0.B60 0.238 0.116 1.0 1.0 1.0 
M¥ 0.967 0.721 0.612 0.979 0.808 0.653 
The minefield model also gives insight into the trade off between losses and 
level of reduction effort. Again, assume the commander will accept a 20% loss in each 
assault craft; equating to losing two LCAC's and three AAV's. The entries in Table 19 
list the probabilities that losses will nol exceed acceptable linrits. This analysis represents 
the case where each vehicle traverses the minefield once. Return trips by the LCAC's are 
considered in the circulation modeL 
Table 19. Trade Off Analysis 
TIl m TR PFAT "fAT PFAT 
.0 ... • .. ~1" .. ~1S*r .01":r ;1"f .15'1';' 
P[LCAC 0.996 0.6259 0.6370 1.0 1.0 1.0 
lo~J 
P(AAV 0.990 0.9996 0.9984 0.9999 0.9999 0.9996 
lo .. .s3l 
Throughout the model, an LCAC on cushion passes over PF AT mines without 
harm. Naturally, should the LCAC go off cushion on a PFAT, damage would result. 
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2. Pre-Breaching Operations 
Employment of any breaching concept requires some prior operations. 
Detecting the location and extent of the minefield(s) is most important. AJ; a subset, .the 
composition of the obstacle is also required. 
Certain anti~landing obstacles must be reduced before BRB can be executed. In 
particular, anti-boat crucifonn obstacles in the SZ will interfere with the rake. However, 
the very presence of such obstacles acts as a cue for focusing intelligence collection 
efforts. 
3. Blast Action 
Explosive destruction of mines works in two ways. The primary action creates 
an over pressure effect; detonating PF AT and TR mines by actuating their trigger 
mechanism. Some number of mines are destroyed by the explosives directly. 
TIle BRL report, [Ref. 13], points out that FAE are ideally suited to breach 
PF AT and TR minefields. An additional benefit of this technique is the minimal 
disturbance caused to the intended breach lane. 
TIle primary difficulty in using blast action to breach in the SZ is the effect of 
water coverage. The water over the mines dissipates the blast wave. To be effective, the 
explosives must be placed hard by the mine prior to detonation. 
BRE avoids this problem by the rake in the SZ and the blast on the exposed 
beach. The amount of explosives required depends on three factors: the path length, the 
P[blast clears a segment of path], level of clearance desired. 
4. Rake Action 
The anti-snag plowing system is fully described in Appendix B. It is 
constructed of bar steel and chain, using off the shelf items. The inventor makes claims 
regarding its robustness, [Ref. 13:p. 16], and efficiency [Ref. 13:p. 21]. Further analysis 
and testing of these claims is recommended. 
For this thesis, consider a rake constructed as detailed in Appendix B; Figure 1, 
but of somewhat greater width. This rake clears an eight meter swath, weighs 
approximately 8,000 pounds and generates 20,000 pounds of drag when plowing. 
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5. Mechanics of BRB 
Initially the: rake, pulled by the helicopter, clears a path through the S2 
minefield. It then is pul led up the beach lane to the far side of the beach minefield: . At 
this point the rake is relea.~ed by the helicopter, for subsequent employment by engineers. 
Figure R, BRB Concept, is a graphic portrayal of this sequence. 
BAXE LEFT FOR ENGINEERS 
BLIIBT LNn: EXPANED FOR LCJi.C'S 
Figure 8. BRB Concept. 
The action of the rake in the SZ is vital to the success ofBRB. Recall the effect 
the TR mine~ have on LCAC's; they are the primary threat to mission success. 
Additionally, the location of this minefield protects it from explosive detonation: it must 
be reduced by physical displacement. 
6. Other Considerations 
BRB depends on local air superiority. While towing the rake, the helicopter is 
very vulnerable to ground fire . Delivery of the blast action in the BRL report is by 
AV-SB dropping CBU-72 FAE bombs [Ref. 13:p. 3]. Multiple sorties are required to 
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ensure r", has been reduced to a specified level. Each additional sortie puts the crew and 
aircraft at greater risk. In addition to local air superiority, suppression of enemy air 
defense must be addressed. 
Lane marking should exploit the capabilities of GPS. The use of GPS to 
disseminate information on minefields, breaches and lanes will assist in maintaining a 
high operational tempo [Ref.}4:p. 3]. 
D. CONCEPT COMPARISON 
1. Design Objectives and Areas of Concern 
Three breaching concepts have been discussed in this thesis. Assuming the 
decision criteria for selecting BBM or BRB is utilized, it is possible to consider how well 
each concept meets stated design objectives while addressing specific areas of concern. 
Table 20 is an assessment of the three systems. 
88M HIB$ 8RB 
y" Ye, 
NlA No Not Required 
Ye, No 
Nooo No"" 
No No No 
SUPPOrt Ye, No 
PpmItIoMI Itimpo 
&$UtPri~? 
.DlverSIonotCritiCilI No Y., 
....... 
2. Measures of Effectiveness 
To determine unequivocally how well each concept satisfies the requirements of 
the MOE's is beyond the level of this thesis. Making such determinations entails 
analyzing a large body of data. At this time few data points exist. However, assuming 
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each concept is employed in the appropriate scenario, some reasonable assessments can 
be made. Using the models previously discussed, the entries in Table 21 are submitted 
for consideration. For MOE 5, the expected value of the random variable D is used. 
Recall that for BBM, E[D] = 2 and for BRB, E[D] = (r.J"' (A.;). The value of nn is 
obtained from the circulation model under the assumption that QA = 0.95. To estimate 
the amount of combat power ashore, assume a 90 minute cycle time for LCAC's. Let the 
AA V's represent 25% of the combat power while ten LCAC loads are equivalent to 25% 
of the combat power available to the MEF (FWD). 
Table 21 Measures of Effectiveness 
BBM HISS BRB 
",OE 1: 1 L..ne:.::1 5 Minutes 6Hoo~ 15 Minutes 
MOE2:Pf~1 N/' ean' t Determine 0.7689 
:::~ I No~ 6 Hours No,", 
M'?!!~~=I 50% 25% (Helo force) 75% 




The Blast Rake Breach (BRB)concept offers the promise of a near-tenn in-stride 
breaching capability. Not only will BRB support OMITS, it can be of immediate aid to 
the conduct of amphibious operations today. Development should commence under the 
aegis of the ACTD at MCCDC, Quantico, Virginia. 
B. CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT 
1. The Countermine Concept 
No system should be developed for its own sake. Rather, development should 
flow from an understanding of how it will serve the Navy-Marine Corps team. 
Understancling how OMITS and the countennine concept will serve the Navy requires a 
fundamental shift in the CA TF's self perception. 
Just as the Commander, Carrier Battle Group and Commander, Air Group think 
with one mind on the air wing as a power projection tool, so must the CATF and CLF 
develop a shared outlook. The beach cannot demarcate separate areas of responsibility; 
the Navy's job goes beyond the simple delivery of the AE. The Marine Corps must learn 
to exploit maneuver at sea to multiply combat power ashore. 
The CATF and CLF together must weigh the MCM effort (e.g., requiring the QA 
> 0.95) against the objective of the OMFTS. Minefields exist to create seams and gaps; 
they put the brakes on operational tempo. The CA TF and CLF must not allow this. 
2. Before We Go "Once More Unto the Breach" 
During the early years of the Strategic Defense Initiative great effort was spent 
developing ways to intercept Soviet ICBM's in the boost phase. If engagement was 
successful, the problem of targeting a plethora of MIRV's was avoided. This principle, 
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shooting dlC archer, ha~ obvious applications for OMFTS and mine countermeasures. 
The CATF and eLF must bear it in mind; they musllook for opportunities to exploit it. 
Short of destroying the mines before emplacement, knowing where they are is 
the next best thing. Efforts to improve surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities 
should bl;; pursued. 
3. Field Tests 
To develop BRB into a useful tactic, several questions must be addressed, 
principally, the claims made by the inventor for the Anti-Snag Plowing System regarding 
durability and efficiency. Then, if warranted, practical matters about a helicopter 
carrying and employing the rake must be explored. 
Since BRB also depends on blast action, "A key but unknown measure, PfMines 
cleared in a given stretch], .. " must be detennined [Ref. 13: p. 1]. This can only be 
accomplished by field firing. 
Finally, as any breaching concept will likely have many moving parts, realistic 
tests in operational conditions will be necessary. The fog of war and friction are not well 
modeled by current simulations. 
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APPENDIX A: TASK ORGANIZATION 
I. Forces Assigned 
a. Naval Forces 
Amphibious Battle Group: 3 LHD'S, 1 LHA, 4 LSD'S, 3 LX'S, 2 LPD'S, 2 
LST'S, 1 LPH (MINE), 2 MCM'S, 2 MHC'S, 6 DO'S, 2 FFG'S, BEACH GROUP DET 
(37 LCAC'S, 4 LCU'S, 6 LCM-8'S), SEAL CO'S+. 
Carrier Battle Group: 2 CVN', 2 CG'S, 4 OD'S, 2 DDG'S,2 FFG'S, 2 AOE'S, 1 
SSN 
b. Marine Forces: II MEF (fwd) HQ, 
GroWld Combat Element INF REGT (REIN): HQ,4 INF BN'S(REIN), I 
ARTY BN+I BTRY, 1 AAAVCOtl PLT,8LAIPLT'S, 1 TANK CO, 1 ANTI-TANK 
PLT+] SECTION, 1 CE COt, I RECON CO+ 
Air Combat Element: COMPOSITE GROUP: 48 MLR'S, 16 CH-53E'S, 
18 AH-I'S, 9 UH- I'S, 20 AV-SB'S 
Combat Service Support Element: BSSG: HQ, DET MAINT BN,DET 
ENGN SPT BN, DET MOTOR TRANSPORT BN, DET MEDIDENTAL BN'S, DET 
LSB, DET SUPPLY BN 
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APPENDIX B: ANTI-SNAG PLOWING SYSTEM 
EXPRESS MAlL NO.: RB402035359 
ANTI-SNAG PlOWING SYSTEM 
Dr. Willard H. Wattenburg, USA 
711 Parkwood Drive 
Chico, CA 95928 
BACKGROUND OF THE JNVENTION 
NTL-8762 
There currently exists an urgent need to remove hundreds of thousands of 
mines that have been buried in the desert in the Middle East. The mine-clearing 
techniques presently in use are expensive and time consuming, as well as dangerous. 
Tanks with heavy, front-mounted rollers are used to blow up mines, with the rollers 
having a life expectancy of about two bits. Tanks with front-mounted, V-shaped plows 
are also used to dig up or detonate buried mines, with the plows having a life expectancy 
of one hit on each side of the plow. Long line charges are also used in attempts to 
detonate mines, but these devices do not work well with the sophisticated trigger 
mechanisms used in modem mines. These mine-clearing techniques are not practical for 
the larger scale removal required now. The situation is complicated further with crude oil 
covering large areas of mined land. 
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Others have attempted to use fanner's harrow devices and/or chains to dig out 
and clear mines, but these have been unsuccessful because they do not dig adequately, 
and they are easily blown apart. 
There thus is a strong demand for a mine-clearing device that is safe, fast, and 
relatively inexpensive. There is aJso a demand for a mine-clearing device that can be 
used in all types of terrain. 
In seeking to design a mine-clearing device suitable for extensive use in the 
Middle East the present inventor has also designed what turns out to be a very effective 
plowing system that requires only 1/3 the energy of prior plowing systems for 6" - 10" 
deep ground Renetration. Consequently, this has generated considerable interest among 
fanners . 
Obstructions have always been a problem when plowing - blades are bent or 
broken, rigid supports are bent, and the like. Thus, whether or not one is clearing mines 
or farming, there is a need for a plow that is not damaged when the blades snag on buried 
objects that will not readily move. 
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
It is an object of the present invention to provide a fast, reliable, and 
inexpensive plow that is suitable for either mine-clearing or farming. The present 
invention provides an anti-snag plowing system which can he pulled from a safe distance 
with a helicopter for mine-clearing, or pulled with a tractor for fanning. 
It is a further object of the present invention to provide a plowing system that 
uses a modular chain matrix construction that is highly resistant to detonations, and, if 
damaged, can be easily fixed. 
It is still a further object of the present invention to provide a plowing system 
that comprises a plurality of digging-knife units, each with a set of digging-knives, 
affixed to the chain matrix in such a way that rpey will not snag on buried, "immovable" 
objects. The digging-knives (so called because they resemble bread knives) are specially 
designed to slice easily through the earth, and to lift buried objects to the surface. 
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These, and other objects of the invention are realized by using a towing unit 
such as a tractor or a helicopter to Iowa chain matrix that loosely connects digging-knife 
units and flexible harrow sections so they are towed in tandem, The leading chains in .the 
matrix pul1 several digging-knife units that fonn a type of plow. The digging-knife units 
in tum pull a harrow via the chain matrix, which advantageously overlaps and ronns a 
chain blanket over the barrow so that any mines thaI detonate in the vicinity of the harrow 
will only destroy a small section of the harrow and chain matrix. Without the chain 
blanket's unique panem and the surprising amount of reinforcement resulting therefrom, 
the harrow would be lifted and caught in the main force of a large mine explosion, and a 
substantial portion, if nOI the entire harrow, would be displaced andlor destroyed. The 
unique two-layer chain matrixlharrow design of the present invention has been 
successfully tested over actual minefields in March 1991. 
The digging-knife units have an anti-snag feature that is unique to the present 
invention. When one of the digging-knife units hits a buried "inunovableft object the 
torque (about the point of contact) exerted on the digging-knife unit from the chains 
pulling it forward is greater than the torque exerted by the chains pulling it backwards 
(due to the drag of the harrow). This occurs because the drag from the harrow which has 
a large amount ofMgive" when pulled more in one place than in others. The chain matrix 
design exploits this flexibility so that upon hitting a snag the digging-knife unit is 
momentarily rotated so the digging-knives are tilted to ride over the object. Once past the 
immovable object the drag from the harrow forces the knives back into the ground. 
Damage to the digging-knife units from snags is thus advantageously avoided with the 
unique design of the present invention. In part, this feature is unique because the towing 
unit must tow both the digging-knife units and the harrow, so not all of the towing force 
can be used for plowing with the digging-knife units. Thus, the present invention takes 
advantage of the added pull on thc digging-knife units from the harrow to provide a 
plowing system with an anti-snag feature. If they are damaged from a mine detonation 
the units are modular, inexpensive, and easy to replace. 
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The above features of the present invention will be more clearly understood 
from the following detailed description of the invention with reference to the drawings. 
BRIEF PESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
Figure 1 is a plan view of a complete chain matrix with the attached 
digging-knife units and harrow according to the present invcntion. 
Figure 2 is a schematic ofa digging-knife unit in accordance with the 
present invention. 
Figure 3 is a schematic of the barrow drag with reinforcing chains 
according to present invention. 
Figure 4 is a diagram to illustrate the anti-snag mechanism of the plow in 
accordance with the present invention. 
Figure 5 is a plan view ofa symmetrical, anti-snag plow according to the 
present invention. 
Figure 6 is a schematic of a reversible digging-knife unit in accordance 
with the present invention. 
Figure 7 is a plan view of an anti-snag plow with electromagnetic or 
pressure wave detonation triggers on the harrow in accordance with the present invention. 
RESCRIPTION OF mE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS 
A single-sided embodiment of the present invention is shown in Fig. I. 
Anti-snag plow 10 includes digging-knife units 12 and harrow 14, which has a modular 
construction and a reinforcing blanket of chains 16. Spreader bars 18 and 20, and draw 
bar 22 are bolted to a chain matrix that includes side chains 24 and reinforcing chains 16. 
Draw bar 22 has draw bar cables 26 that end in a fastener 28 for attachment to a 
helicopter or tractor via a tow line. a unique, major feature of this plow system is that is 
allows "stand-off" minesweeping by mechanical means for the frrst time, because the 
helicopter can easily maneuver and tow thc chain matrix on the end of a 400' - 800' cable. 
Ground vehicles may also be used for clearing mines. For instance, two vehicles may 
tow plow 10 between and behind them if two parallel lanes have already been cleared. 
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When towed, draw bar 22 pulls on five side chains 24 which are bolted to 
the front and rear sides of digging-knife units \2. (In operation with a helicopter, the tow 
cable is long enough to insure draw bar 22 remains close to the ground.) If thcre are two 
rows of digging-knife units 12, as shown in Fig. 1, side chains 24 are bolted in series so 
the rear of the first row pulls the front of the second row. (Optionally, each digging-knife 
unit 12 may have individual side chains 24, although weight is a consideration when 
towing with a helicopter. Also, adjacent digging-knife units may share the same side 
cbain, as in Fig. I, or they may have separatc side chains.) Side chains 24 are attached to 
harrow \4 (may be attached directly, or via frOnt spreader bar 18) so the rear bolt 
attachment to the second row of digging-knife units 12 pulls harrow 14. 
Front spreader bar 18 and rear spreader bar 20 are attached to harrow 14 
and cbains 16. Chains 16 are patterned to form a reinforcement for harrow \4 that 
dramatically reduces the damage sustained from a mine detonation. [fharrow 14 is not 
covered with a chain blanket it is lifted and tom apart by the blast. It was found that the 
unexpected protection provided by ehains 16 occurs because the extra reinforcement they 
provide is sufficient to prevent harrow 14 from being lifted by the explosion. 
Consequently, most of the energy and momentum from the mine explosion escapes 
before it can spread through the harrow's loose lattice-like structure, and only local 
damage is sustained. This may be easily repaired because harrow 14 has a modular 
construction of I m x 2m sections. of course, chain blanket 16 is not required for farming. 
In a preferred embodiment all chain sections are 3/8", high test schedule 
70, and are 16' long. Side chains 24 in the embodiment of Fig. 1 are one chain section 
long. All chain attachments are made with simple chain loops and bolts so repair is 
simple. 
Draw bar 22 has a 4" diameter, and front spreader 18 and rear spreader 20 
arc 3" and 4", respectively. All bars are sehedule 40. The metal bar have small chain 
loops or eyelets welded in the locations wbere they are fastened to the loops at the ends of 
the chains. 
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Harrow 14 is made in England by Parmiter & Sons, Inc., and it comes in 
I m x 2m sections to form a harrow approximately 15' x 30' for the present invention. The 
sections fit together with hooks to make a harrow with any desired size. This particular 
type of harrow is preferred because it bas a great deal offlexibi\ity. 
Fig. 2 shows a digging-knife unit 12 according to the present invention. 
Each digging-knife 30 is 114" - 3/8" thick by 3" - 4" wide bevel-edge plow steel. 
Digging-knives 30 are 6" - 12" long, or even longer depending on the soil. They 
preferably form a 28-30 degree forward angle with the vertical when plowing. Top 
bracket 32 is 4"xl "x3/8" angle iron, or 5" wide flat bar rolled up slightly to for a 
streamlined surface for the dirt to flow over. Digging-knives 30 are butt welded on both 
sides to top bracket 32. Side brackets 34 and back bracket 36 are 3"x3"xI/4" angle iron. 
Side brackets 34 are 4'-8' long, and top bracket 32 and back 36 are about 40" long in the 
present embodiment. "Mine-catching" baskets 38 has approximately 3" mesh. Baskets 
38 may be used to catch debris that digging-knives 30 tum up, which in tests is virtually 
everything larger than the preferred 4" spacing between them. If two rows of 
digging-knife units 12 are used, as in Fig. 1, digging-knives 30 in the second row may be 
made deeper than the digging-knives in the first row. 
A detail of harrow 14 and reinforcing chains 16 is shown in Fig. 3. Chains 
16 running lengthwise are spaced the same as side chains 24, or about 40". This 
facilitates connections along front spreader bar 18. Cross-chains 16 are spaced at 4' - 8' 
intervals. Harrow 14 is made of 1/2" -3/4" wire rod bent to form an interlocking pattern 
with wire ends bent down to from tines 40 that are 2" - 6" long, and spaced about every 
8". harrow 14 has a large amount offlexibiJity due to the loose connections at the joints. 
If plow lOis made as described, with 6" digging-knives and 3" tines, the 
entire unit weighs about 4000 pounds. A Vertol 107II helicopter was able to pull it at 
about 10 mph through rocky soil with about 10,000 pounds of towing force. Of this, 
about 4000 pounds was due to the drag from the harrow. The plow performed superbly, 
with everything larger than 4" (the spacing between the digging-knives) pulled up, and 
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there were no broken digging-knives. Imitation mines were also buried at typical depths, 
and all of these were pulled up. 
The anti-snag feature ofpJow 10 is best understood with reference to Fig. 
4. The drag force on digging-knife unit 12 is such that the tension TR on thc rear side 
chains 24 kcep side bracket 34 at ground level unless digging-knives 30 strike an 
obstruction that would be likcly to damage digging-knife unit 12 or stop the towing 
vehicle if there was no anti-snag release mechanism. Whcn a digging-knifc unit 12 hits 
an "immovable" object the tension in side chains 24 towing it forward, 'tp givcs rise to a 
torque 't f that wants to rotate it one direction. A reverse torque 'til' due to the drag tension 
TR from harrow )4, wants to mtate snagged digging-knife unit 12 in the other direction. 
However, 'til < 'tF because there is enough elasticity in hanuw 14 to allow a portion of the 
chain matrix to change its configuration as the snagged digging-knife unit 12 passes over 
the obstruction. The changing configuration adjusts to allow the rear side chains 24 
between the snagged digging-knife unit 12 and ~w 14 to move forward more rapidly 
than the rear side chains of the other digging-knife units. This built-in elasticity prevents 
TR from ever getting large enough to cause 'til >cF• Snagged digging-knife unit 12 rotates 
forward unit ) digging-knives 30 are tilted forward to pass over the obstruction. (Note 
that once digging-knife unit 12 passes over the obstruction 'tF vanishes except for the 
nonnal plowing torque, and 0 inuned.iately returns to zero since 'til in nonzero, i.e., 't1l=L x 
TR x sinO. This prevents cligging-knife unit 12 from rolling all the way over in tile 
forward direction.) 
lftbere is more than one row of digging-knife units 12, and a 
digging-knife unit in the front row hits an obstruction sufficiently embedded to initiate 
the anti-snag mechanism, the ensuing rotation advantageously puJls the digging-knives of 
the digging-knife unit in the second row out of the ground. 
Fig. 5 shows a plan view of an anti-snag plow 42 that can be towed in 
either direction, depending on which side it is on. This is important and convenient for 
helicopter towing operations because lifting the plow cleans the chain matrix of mines 
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and other dehris. Plow 42 can be lifted, cleaned, and put back down on the other side. 
The towing cable from the helicopter can then be rapidly changed from onc side to the 
other for towing in the other direction. 
Plow 42 has a single row of symmetrical digging~knife units 44 that are 
offset with rcspcct to their neighbors. lfthe towing direction is as indicated, the parts 
identificd by the same number in Fig. 1 are the same, and all of the previous discussion 
pertaining to these parts is applicable here. As drawn, if plow 42 is rotated about an axis 
parallel with side chains 24 the towing direction is reversed. 
Harrows 14 and 46 may be double-sided with tines on top and bottom. 
Chain blanket 16 is then sandwiched between the top and bottom harrow layers. In this 
way the ground is harrowed both before and after the digging-knives pass through. They 
arc each preferably made slightly smaller in this embodiment because of weight 
considerations. Bar 48 serves as an extra spreader bar, and there is a "vestigial" set of 
draw cables 50 wben plow 42 is towed in the direction indicated. 
A symmetrical digging-knife unit 44 for plow 42 is shown in Fig. 6. In 
this case the parts identified by the same number in Fig. 2 are the same, and all of 
previous discussion pertaining to these parts is applicable bere. In symmetrical 
digging-knife unit 44 the reversed top bracket 50 replaces back bracket 36 in the 
single-sided embodiment. "Mine-catching" basket 52 is modified to allow reversed 
digging-knives 48 to serve as the back of the basket. Since the basket mesh only runs 
along side brackets 34 it does not interfere with the operation of digging-knife unit 44. 
An embodiment of the present invention that utilizes harrow 14 as a 
platform for magnetic or sonic triggering devices is shown in Fig. 7. (Modified anti-snag 
plow 54 is shown as having two rows of digging-knife unit 12 that are not staggered with 
respect to their neighbors, and each has individual side chains 24 - this is another 
configuration in a preferred embodiment.) 
Harrow 14 carries triggering devices 56 capable of activating the 
sophisticated fuses used in modern military mines which are designed to detect a change 
in the local magnetic field due to an approaching heavy metal object such as a tank, or to 
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detect ground pressure waves from an approaching military vehicle. Triggering devices 
56 may generate either magnetic fields, or sonic waves with electricity supplied from a 
generator carried on the towing unit. 
The devices 56 that arc: shown in Fig. 7 illustrate an embodiment in which 
devices 56 are coils of electrical wire powered by electrical cables from the towing 
vehicle, which carries a generator. Coils 56 generate local high-intensity magnetic fields 
of any desired frequency. In a preferred embodiment the magnetic fields of adjacent coils 
alternate in polarity. Harrow 14 foIIllS an ideal ferromagnetic conduit so the tips of tines 
40 are strong magnetic field sources. In an alternative embodiment devices 56 may 
include acoustic wave diaphragms to generate sonic wave patterns. These embodiment.~ 
can be used to trigger the magnetic and acoustic fuses used in modem mines. 
The embodiments described above are not intended to limit the scope of 
the invention. For instance, a steel cable matrix could be used (instead ofa chain matrix) 
in an anti-snag plowing system used for farming. The shape of the digging-knives may 
be varied for different uses and soil conditions. Other flexible harrows may be used. 
Many variations are possible. The scope of the invention is only intended to be limited 
by the following claims. 
Q.AIMS 
I. An anti-snag plowing system comprising; 
at least one rigid digging-knife unit including a digging-knife portion 
having at least one digging-knife with a first length, and a bracket portion having a 
second length fonning an obtuse angle with said digging-knife portion wherein; 
said second length is longer than said first length. and; 
towing means attached to said bracket portion at a towing location, and 
pulling means attached to said bracket portion at a pulling location more distant from said 
digging-knife portion than said towing location. 
2. The system of claim 1 wherein said towing means exerts a towing force 
on said bracket portion along a towing axis, and; 
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said pulling means excrts a pulling force on said bracket portion along a 
pulling axis, wherein; 
said towing force is greater than said pulling force so that; 
said towing force tows said digging-knife portion through a rcsistive 
medium that excrts a variable resistive force on said digging-knife portion with a 
component in the same direction as said pulling force. 
3, The system of claim 2 wherein said bracket and said towing axis are 
parallel when said resistive force is less than a given value, and; 
said hracket is rotaled with respect to said lowing axis when said resistive 
forcc is greater than said givcn value, 
4, The system of claim 2 wherein said pulling means is connected to a 
source of drag on said resistive medium. 
5, The system of claim 4 wherein said at least onc digging-knifc mllt is a 
plurality of digging-knife units. 
n. The system of claim 5 wherein said samce of drag is a flexible harrow. 
7. The system of claim 6 wherein said towing means and said pulling 
means are side chains. 
8. The system of claim 7 wherein said harrow is covered with a pattern of 
chains to fonns a chain blanket. 
9. The system of claim 7 wherein said side chains are connected to a rigid 
draw bar and said harrow. 
10. The system of claim 9 wherein draw cables are connected to said draw 
bar on one end and to each other on their other end. 
11. The system of claim 9 further comprising a first spreader bar 
connected to said harrow on the same side as said side chains, and a second spreader bar 
connected to said harrow on the opposite side as said side chains. 
12. The system of claim 6 wherein said harrow has elcctrical devices 
mounted thereon wbich generate magnetic field or sonic waves. 
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13. A reversible plow system comprising a digging-knife unit with one set 
digging-knives pointed upwards on top of said digging-knife unit, and one set of 
digging-knives pointing downwards on the hottom of said digging-knife urnt. 
14. The plow system of claim 13 further comprising harrows connected to 
each side of said digging-knife wut wherein one harrow has tines pointing upwards, and 
the other harrow has tines pointing downwards. 
15. A method of clearing mines comprising: 
using one or more helicopters or ground vehicles with towlines to tow an 
anti-snag plowing system that includes; 
at least one rigid digging-knife unit including a digging-knife panioo 
having at least one digging-knife with a first length, and a bracket panioo having a 
second length forming an obtuse angle with said digging-knife portion, wherein; 
said second length is longer than said first length, and; 
towing means attached to said bracket portion at a towing location, and 
pulling means attached to said bracket portion at a pulling location more distant from said 
digging-knife portion than said towing location, wherein; 
said towing means is attached to said helicopter via said towline, and said 
pulling means is attached to drag force means. 
16. The method of claim 15 wherein said drag force means is a flexible 
harrow, and said towing and pulling means are chains, and; 
a pattern of chains lies on top of said harrow. 
ABSTRACT OF WE DISCI OSUBE 
An anti-snag plowing system suitable for clearing mines in the Middle East is 
disclo~d. Advantageously, the plowing system has also been found to be an efficient 
and effective soil conditioner, making it a useful farming tool as well. The plowing 
system comprises several dlgging-knife unit, or plows, and a harrow. Both are attached 
in tandem to a chain matrix, which is pulled with either a helicopter or tractor. The 
digging-knife units rotate if the digging-knives hit an immovable snag. The harrow is 
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covered with a chain blanket, and may have magnetic or sonic wave mine triggers if the 
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